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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced by plaintiff respondent, 
Management Services Corporation (hereinafter "f.lanagement 
Services"), Purchaser, against Development Associates, Seller, 
for the breach of a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 
December 7, 1976 (hereinafter "the Contract"), wherein 
Management Development Associates agreed to sell to Management 
Services eight (8) improved lots in the Daybreak Phase III 
Subdivision for a total price of Eighty Thousand Dollars 
($80,000), calculated at Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) per 
lot. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried May 31, 1978, before the Honorable 
Peter F. Leary, of the Third Judicial District Court, who sat 
without a jury. The trial court, after having received and 
considered the evidence and memoranda submitted by the parties, 
found that the Contract was divisible; that respondent 
defaulted with respect to the purchase of the first two lots by 
not making payment therefor in March of 1977 and thereby 
forfeited all of its right, title, and interest in the two 
lots; and that appellant wrongfully terminated the Contract 
with respect to the remaining six (6) lots which were to be 
paid in full by respondent in April, May, and June of 1977. 
Accordingly, on February 1, 1979, the trial court entered 
judgment dismissing the quiet title claim of plaintiff 
respondent, but awarding it, as damages for defendant-
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appellant's breach of contract, the amount of Seven Thousand, 
Seven Hundred Dollars ($7,700) in lost profits, Two Thousand, 
Four Hundred Thirty-Eight Dollars ($2,438) for lost 
commissions, Six Hundred Dollars ($600) for the deposit 
wrongfully retained by Defendant, costs of One Hundred 
Fifty-Nine Dollars and Five Cents ($159.05) and attorney's fees 
of One Thousand, Eight Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1,850) for a 
total judgment of Twelve Thousand, Seven Hundred Forty-Seven 
Dollars and Five Cents ($12,747.05) with interest at the rate 
of Eight Percent (8%). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, Management Services, asks this Court to affirm 
the judgment of the trial court and issue an order to the trial 
court directing it to determine and award to respondent its 
costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, 
incurred in connection with this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Respondent accepts the appellant's Statement of Material 
Facts, as supplemented by the information that follows: 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract executed on December 7, 
1976 by Development Associates and Management Services was 
prepared by Development Associates. (R. at 134, 135). The same 
day the contract was executed, an Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase was executed by Edward A. White for 
Management Services as Purchaser, and by Marvin J. Kirkham, for 
Development Associates, as Seller, of Lots 208 and No. 212 of 
- 2 -
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Phase II of the same Daybreak Subdivision wherein were located 
the eight (8) lots of the Contract at issue. (R. at 1]3). 
Subsequently, the sale of those two apparently noncontiguous 
lots to Management Services was closed and the lots were 
transferred by Management Services to Red Carpet Construction. 
(R. at 228, 128). 
Mr. Kirkham of Development Associates had brought great 
experience to his negotiations with Mr. White of Management 
Services Mr. Kirkham had graduated from college with a degree 
in business management, had attended one (1) year of law 
school, had worked for several years as a real estate age~t, 
and later as a broker, and had been involved in five or six 
hundred transactions where either the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract form or an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
form was used. (R. at 239-+2). 
The consideration for the eight (8) lots named in the 
Contract was calculated on the basis of Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000) per lot. (R. at 129). The deposit on the Contract 
was likewise calculated at One Hundred Dollars ($100) per lot 
for a total of Eight Hundred Dollars ($800). (R. at 265). 
Separate warranty deeds were to be issued by Development 
Associates for each lot as it was paid for. (R. at 266). 
The eight (8) lots named in the Contract were encumbered by 
a mortgage in favor of State Savings & Loan and by an 
obligation of approximately Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000) per 
lot in favor of Land Funding, Inc., the party from which 
- 3-
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Development Associates was purchasing the property. (R. at 
268) As Management Services paid for each lot, Development 
Associates intended to transfer money to State Savinqs & Loan 
and to Land Funding, Inc., satisfying the obligations owed 
those parties, and thereby procure a release from those parties 
of each lot on a lot by lot basis. (R. at 268). 
Paragraph 21 of the Contract provides for the defaulting 
party to pay "all costs and expenses, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing this 
agreement, . or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder 
or by the statutes of t~e State of Utah whether such remedy is 
pursued by filing a suit or otherwise." (R. at 10). 
ARGUMENT 
Point 
THE PARTIES INTENDED THE CONTRACT 
TO BE SEVERABLE 
The only issue raised by appellant on this appeal is the 
correctness of the trial court's determination that the 
Contract is divisible or severable. In this situation, it is 
elementary that: 
(o)n appeal the evidence is viewed in 
the light most favorable to sustain the 
lower court, and the findings will not 
be disturbed unless they are clearly 
against the weight of the evidence or 
it manifestly appears that the court 
misapplied the law to the established 
facts. ( Citations ami tted). 
Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 Utah Zd 251, 495 P.Zd 28, 29-30 (1972). 
-4-
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Admittedly, this Court has every advantage a trial court 
has in construing an instrument from its written terms. 
Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P.2d 221, 223 
(1958). However, where a document is ambiguous, as the instant 
Contract will shortly be shown to be, thus opening the door to 
extraneous explanation, it is appropriate to defer to the 
findings of the trial court. 
The fact that the trial court found against the appellant 
on the severability issue accords with the well-established 
principle that an ambiguous document is to be "strictly 
construed against him who draws it." Maw v. Noble, 10 Utah 2d 
440, 354 P.Zd 121, 123 (1960). The fact that a form contract 
was used in the instant case does not militate otherwise where, 
as here, the use of that form was suggested by the appellant 
who had opportunity to modify or make additions to the form as 
he saw fit. (R. at 265-66). 
As this case demands construction of the Contract at issue, 
standard principles of contract construction apply. 
The most fundamental of these is that 
the meaning and effect to be given a 
contract depends upon the intent of the 
parties. 
Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 30 Utah 
2d 187, 515 P.2d 446, 448 (1973) citin~ Jensen's Used Cars v. 
Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276, 323 P.2d 259 (1959). 
Clearly, if the parties had agreed at the outset on the 
issue whether the transaction were to be severable and if the 
parties had plainly expressed that intent in the Contract, th~ 
- 5 -
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matter would be closed. As the Contract is silent on that 
precise issue, an ambiguity arises. The fact of that ambiguity 
is substantiated by appellant's recourse to testimony at trial 
and to other matters outside the language of the Contract for 
support for appellant's position. (Brief of Appellant at 
ll-14). 
Appellant's attempt at disclaimer with the phrase "the 
language of the contract speaks for itself" (Brief of Appellant 
at 10) is conclusory and self serving. The only relevant 
contract language is contained in paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. (R. at 
9). Paragraph 2 designates the eight (8) lots to be conveyed by 
naming them, one by one. Paragraph 3 specifies that, as 
consideration for those lots, the sum of Eighty Thousand Dollars 
($80,000) is to be paid, Eight Hundred Dollars ($800) down and 
the remaining Seventy Nine Thousand Two Hundred Dollars 
($79,200) in four (4) equal installments of an amount precisely 
calculated to complete payment on two (2) lots at a time. 
Paragraph 6 states that the property to be conveyed is 
encumbered by obligations amounting to "Eight Thousand, Six 
Hundred Dollars ($8,600) per lot." These provisions just cited 
contain no clear expression of the intent of the parties on the 
issue of the Contract's severability. However, one desiring to 
make inferences therefrom is struck by the divisible nature of 
both the property being conveyed and the consideration to be 
exchanged therefor and by the pairing of the installment 
payments with the closing on two lots per month. The silence of 
- 6-
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the Contract on the severability issue also raises the 
possibility that the parties may not have even thought about 
severability, let alone arriving at a mutual understanding 
thereon and reducing it to writing. 
In any case, the ambiguity of the Contract begets the 
necessity of resort to extraneous evidence on the issue whether 
the parties intended the Contract to be severable, or, short of 
that, on what the parties would have agreed upon had they 
thought about the matter. In the words of this Court 
. The parties 1 intent . is 
derived from looking at the entire 
contract and the relationship of the 
parts to the whole and whether it was 
intended that the total agreement be 
severable. 
In exploring a contract on this issue, 
the factfinder 1 • • may and should 
look to extraneous evidence concerning 
the background and surrounding 
circumstances in order to make that 
determination. 
Brown v. Board of Education of Morgan County School Dist., 560 
P.Zd 1129, 1131 (Utah 1977) quoting Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. 
v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., supra, 515 P.Zd at 448. 
Point II 
THE CONTRACT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
IS SEVERABLE 
An analysis of the evidence extraneous to the Contract 
shows that the Contract is divisible under any appropriate 
legal standard of severability. Those standards must be 
examined before proceeding to a consideration of the evidence. 
- 7-
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Two main tests of severability emerge from the reported 
cases and treatises. The first test, the "apportionability 
test," looks to whether the consideration for the Contract may 
be apportioned to distinct acts to be performed under the 
Contract. The second test, "the essence of the contract," 
seeks an answer to the question whether the Contract would have 
been entered into at all if a part alleged to be divisible had 
not been made a part of the original bargain. 
Perhaps the most succinct formulation of the 
apportionability test is that given by the Idaho Supreme Court 
in Huggins v. Green Top Dairy Farms, 75 Idaho. 436, 273 P.Zd 
399, at 406 (1954): 
Where several things are to be done 
under a contract, and if the money 
consideration to be paid is apportioned 
to each item, the covenants are 
severable and independent. (Citations 
omitted). 
In Huggins, the plaintiffs contracted to sell the defendant 
the real and personal property of the Huggins dairy. A price 
was agreed upon for the real property and most of the personal 
property, to be paid in installments. The remaining items, 
inventory, accounts receivable, and similar things, were to be 
paid for in a sum to be later determined by procedure and 
methods provided for in the contract. After defendant missed 
three installment payments, the plaintiffs served the defendant 
a written notice claiming that defendant had defaulted in the 
payment of the installments missed and that defendant had 
failed to pay a specified amount allegedly due for the accounts 
- 8-
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receivable and inventory. By this notice, plaintiffs demanded 
possession of the property. Defendant tende~ed the amount 
claimed due for the installment payments, but refused to tender 
anything for the accounts receivable or inventory, claiming 
that the price of those items was an unliquidated amount. This 
tender was wrongfully refused, and plaintiffs instituted suit 
for recission of the contract and for the appointment of a 
receiver to operate the dairy. On appeal from the trial 
court's decision granting the relief requested, the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had wrongfully refused 
the tender of the missed installment payments and that even 
assuming the defendant was in default for the amount allegedly 
due for the accounts receivable and inventory, that part of the 
contract was severable as a separate consideration was 
apportioned to those items and default in the payment for those 
items would not justify recission of the rest of the contract. 
Another formulation of the apportionability test was given 
by the Nevada Supreme Court in Dredge Corporation v. Wells 
Cargo, Inc., 82 Nev. 69, 410 P.Zd 751, 754 (1966) as follows: 
A contract is divisible where, by its 
terms, performance of each party is 
divided into two or more parts; the 
number of parts due from each party is 
the same; and the performance of each 
part is the agreed exchange for a 
corresponding part by the other party. 
In that case, Wells, a gravel business operator, contracted 
to improve and perform the annual assessment work on numerous 
unpatented mining claims owned by Dredge. In return, the 
- 9-
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contract obligated Dredge to convey to Wells an undivided 
one-half interest in each claim "when patents have been issued 
on any of said claims." Wells gave the agreed performance on 
many of the mining claims, but not on the remaining claims for 
various reasons. After patents were issued to Dredge on 
several of the improved claims, Dredge refused to convey the 
promises interest to Wells on the ground that Wells had failed 
to perform its contractual obligations on all claims on which 
patents had not been issued. Wells filed suit against Dredge 
for specific performance of the promises to convey an undivided 
one half interest in the patented claims and for a partition. 
The Nevada Supreme Court upheld that ruling of the trial court 
that the contract was divisible as to each mining claim even in 
the face of a contract cancellation clause which provided that, 
if Wells failed to perform "any condition, covenant, term, or 
agreement herein, at the time and in the manner herein set 
forth after five (5) days' written notice of such failure, then 
this agreement is automatically cancelled The state 
supreme court held that this clause was compatible with a 
divisible contract and granted specific performance of the 
covenant to convey the undivided one-half interest in each 
patented claim as to which Wells had fully performed. 
In the instant case, the performance of each party was 
div1ded into several discreet acts, each of which was the 
agreed exchange for a corresponding counterperformance of the 
other party. Upon receipt of the $800 deposit of respondent, 
- l 0 -
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appellant covenanted to hold the lots in question for the 
respondent until the times specified in the contract had 
expired and to not convey or offer to convey the lots to any 
other party until after those dates had passed. As each 
installment payment of $19,800 was made, the sale of two lots 
was to be closed and the lots conveyed to respondent. Indeed, 
the emphasis of the brief of appellant on the importance of the 
alleged intention of the parties to the exclusion of other 
factors concedes the facts that this Contract meets the 
requirements of the apportionability test of severability. 
The second test of divisibility of a contract, the essence 
of the contract test, has also been variously stated. An 
oft-quoted formulation of that test is that of the Arizona 
Supreme Court in Waddell v. White, 51 Ariz. 526, 78 P.Zd 490, 
496 (1938) where the Court stated: 
A contract may both in its nature and 
by its terms be severable, and yet 
rendered entire by the intention of the 
parties. We think that perhaps the 
best test is whether all of the things, 
as a whole, are of the essence of the 
contract. That is, if it appeared that 
the purpose was to take the whole or 
none, then the contract would be 
entire; otherwise, it would be 
severable. 
This test has been formulated by Williston in the following 
terms: 
The essential test to determine whether 
a number of promises constitute one 
contract or more than one, is simple. 
It can be nothing else than the answer 
to an inquiry whether the parties 
assented to all the promises as a 
- ll -
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single whole, so that there would have 
been no bargain whatever, if any 
promise or set of promises were struck 
out. 
Williston on Contracts, Vol. II, p. 1652; Rev.Ed. Vol. III, p. 
2422, as quoted in Morgan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 
Id. 506, 201 P.2d 976, 980 (1948). 
The view taken by cases adopting the essence of the 
contract test is that the court will consider as an important, 
but not the determinative, factor, if applicable, the 
divisibility of the subject matter of the contract and the 
apportionability of the consideration. If the contract meets 
the requirements of this divisibility or apportionability test, 
the contract is considered prima facie severable. The essence 
of the contract test is then applied to settle the issue. See, 
~· Waddell v. White, supra; Boesiger v. DeModena, 88 Idaho. 
337, 339 P.2d 635 (1965). 
Applying the essence of the contract test to the instant 
case, there is little doubt that the parties would have 
contracted for the sale of less than eight lots. There is the 
fact that the same day the contract was executed, the same 
parties signed an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
for two other lots in a different phase of the same subdivision 
containing the eight lots to be conveyed under the contract. 
The sale of the two lots in Phase II of the Daybreak 
Subdivision was later closed by respondent with appellant and 
title to the lots was eventually passed to the designee of 
respondent, Red Carpet Construction. (R. at 128, ZOO). This 
- l ~ -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
transaction evidences the apparent willingness of appellant to 
sell to respondent as many (or as few)· lots as ·respondent 
desired to purchase. 
Appellant's willingness to sell the eight lots in Phase III 
as separate parcels is shown even more conclusively by the fact 
that after appellant wrongfully forfeited respondent's interest 
in six of the eight lots, appellant sold those same eight lots 
to seven different parties. (R. at 236-37). 
The fact that the encumbrances on the Phase III lots could 
be removed "on a lot release basis" only substantiates this 
point of view. (R. at 268). Nor is a different conclusion 
indicated by the trial testimony of Mr. Kirkham, appellant's 
agent, when he stated: "As each lot was paid for and cleared 
we would issue a warranty deed." (R. at 266). 
Appellant, in its brief, attempts to make much of the fact 
that the total consideration for the conveyance of the eight 
lots under the contract was $80,000, in an attempt to imply 
that a contract for the sale of fewer lots and a 
correspondingly smaller amount of money would not have been 
entered into. That reasoning does not withstand analysis. A 
consideration expressed in terms of money is the most divisible 
consideration possible. It is the very divisibility of money 
that has enabled it to supplant barter as a means of trade. 
The use of the phrase "total payment" in reference to the 
$80,000 consideration (R. at 266) does not help appellant as 
linguistically, the use of the word "total" in such a context 
-13-
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implies that the speaker had in mind the sum of several 
separate items. The fact that the parties allocated the sum of 
$19,800 "to complete payment on two (2) lots" at a time 
completes the destruction of any argument based on the 
specification of the consideration for an intent to sell all 
eight lots as a group or none at all. 
The conclusion that the parties had no intent to contract 
for all eight lots or none at all is buttressed by the fact 
that appellant knew from the outset that respondent would 
merely be reconveying the lots to other and various parties. 
(R. at 256). Thus, appellant would have had no expectation 
that might have justified a sale of not less than all eight 
lots to respondent such as might have been the case if 
respondent were a builder who had planned to impose a uniform 
scheme of construction on all eight lots. 
The conclusion is inescapable that the only reason for 
listing all eight lots under the one contract was appellant's 
apparent perception that it had a willing buyer for the lots 
who could provide appellant with the money it desired out of 
the project sooner than anyone else. That desire of appellant 
to receive its money out of the development is entirely 
consistent with an intent to sell any number of lots, either 
eight or fewer than eight, that any prospective purchaser would 
he willing to buy. 
Respondent concedes that under the contract it could take 
tltle to any two of the eight lots to be conveyed upon tender 
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uf the proper payment therefor. However, that fact does not 
render the contract entire. It simply does not follow from 
paragraph 19 of the contract, as appellant asser~s at p. 13 of 
its brief, that if the parties had agreed beforehand as to the 
order in which the lots were to be conveyed upon receipt of 
proper payment therefor, title to all eight lots would have 
remained in Development Associates. Indeed, respondent fails 
to see how any specification of the order in which the lots 
were to be conveyed or lack thereof would affect appellant's 
obligation under paragraph 19 to transfer a warranty deed on 
each lot to respondent upon its tender of proper payment as 
appellant's agent testified at trial it was obligated to do. 
(R. at 266). 
Furthermore, appellant's attempted use of the judgment 
phrase "the first two lots" to imply that the court erred 
(Brief of Appellant at 12-13) gives to that language a meaning 
unnatural for its context and additionally is irrelevant to the 
question of the intent of the parties. The trial court's use 
of the quoted phrase was simply meant to convey the idea that 
respondent defaulted with respect to the purchase of the first 
two lots it claimed a right to in March, 1977 under the 
allowance of choice given the respondent by the contract and 
did not in the least intend to convey the idea that any order, 
either that in which the lots were listed on the contract or 
any other, had been imposed upon respondent restricting it to 
take certain lots only at designated times. 
- 15-
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Rather than imposing "upon the parties a contract to which 
they would not have assented," as appellant asserts in its 
brief at 14, the trial court in this case simply found, as it 
was obligated to do on the facts before it, that the contract 
at issue is divisible and "established separate obligations and 
responsibilities between plaintiff and defendant." (R. at 
99). This conclusion of law was not the result of a 
misapplication of the appropriate legal standards to the facts 
before the court. The divisible nature of the contract's 
subject matter, and its apportionment of the considerations on 
each side into equivalent and corresponding parts, meet the 
requirements of the apportionability test and this contract is 
prima facie severable. Nothing appearing in the record to 
justify the conclusion that the parties intended to contract 
for all or nothing, the court could do no other than declare 
the severability of the contract absolute. To quote the 
Supreme Court of California 
The rule is well settled that where 
several things are to be done under a 
contract, if the money consideration to 
be paid is apportioned to each of the 
items to be performed, the covenants 
are ordinarily regarded as severable 
and independent. (Citation omitted) 
The argument that the court cannot 
apportion because the parties did not 
expressly apportion is without merit. 
That argument exalts form over 
substance. 
Keene v. Harling, 61 Cal.Zd 318, 38 Ca1.Rptr. 513, 392 P.Zd 
273, 277 (1964). 
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As this court has acknowledged in Prudential Savings & Loan 
Association v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 7 Utah Zd 
366, 325 P.Zd 899, 903 (1958): 
(I)t is a recognized principle of 
contract law that a breach of an 
insubstantial nature, which is 
severable and does not vitally change 
the transaction, does not release the 
other party completely from performing 
his obligations under the contract, but 
gives rise to a right for damages for 
any loss occasioned thereby. (Footnote 
omitted). 
All legal standards of severability having been met by the 
facts of this case, this Court should affirm the judgment of 
the trial court awarding respondent the damages it suffered as 
a result of appellant's wrongful termination as to six of the 
eight lots to be conveyed under the contract. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS COSTS AND 
REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR SUCCESSFULLY 
RESISTING THE INSTANT APPEAL. 
The contract between the parties to this suit contains the 
following language at paragraph 21 on the payment of attorney's 
fees: 
The Buyer and Seller each agree that 
should they default in any of the 
covenants or agreements contained 
herein, that the defaulting party shall 
pay all costs and expenses, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee, which may 
arise or accrue from enforcing this 
agreement, or in obtaining possession 
of the premises covered hereby, or in 
pursuing any remedy provided hereunder 
or by the statutes of the State of Utah 
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whether such remedy is pursued by 
filing a suit or otherwise. (R. at 10) 
Respondent respectfully requests that this Court enforce 
this contractual provision by issuing an order directing the 
trial court to award to respondent the amount incurred by it 
for reasonable attorney's fees in successfully resisting this 
appeal. 
This Court has stated that "Attorneys' fees on appeal are 
discretionary with this court Swain v. Salt Lake 
Real Estate & Investment Co., 3 Utah Zd 121, 279 P.Zd 709, 711 
(1955). Admittedly, the facts in Swain which involved an 
action for forfeiture under a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
which was successfully defended against at trial and the result 
was upheld on appeal, are similar to the instant case. 
However, in Swain the parties stipulated that $250 would be a 
reasonable attorney fee for either party. After finding that 
the Swain action was one to enforce the contract, this Court 
construed the stipulation to cover services rendered also on 
appeal. Accordingly, the prevailing party in that case was 
awarded the amount specified in the stipulation for attorneys' 
fees. 
In the instant case, appellant has taken this appeal 
arguing, in essence, only that the legal standard of 
severability, as to which standard there is no disagreement, 
was not properly applied to the facts. Having been put to the 
necessity by this appeal of showing that the judgment of the 
trial court soundly applied the facts of the instant case to 
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the proper legal standard, the respondent, under any reasonable 
view of how this Court ought to exercise its discretionary 
power, is entitled to be reimbursed for attorney's fees 
incurred by it in connection with this appeal. As the parties 
have made no stipulation as to what a reasonable attorney's fee 
would be for the trial of this case with an appeal, thus 
distinguishing it from Swain, and as the record clearly shows 
that the amount awarded respondent for attorney's fees at the 
trial below was only for services rendered up to and including 
the day of that trial (R. at 274), respondent should be awarded 
an additional amount to compensate it for fees incurred as a 
result of this appeal. 
The only other Utah case to expressly articulate this rule 
of discretion contains additional qualifying language that is 
disturbing to respondent is Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney 
~. 556 P.Zd 1273 (Utah 1976). After citing Swain for the 
proposition that attorney's fees on appeal are discretionary 
with this Court, the opinion adds "and then only when 
specifically authorized by statute or rule of court." Id. at 
1275. As authority for that qualification, the opinion cites 
first of all Marks v. Culmer, 7 Utah 163, 25 P. 743 (l891). At 
issue there was the allowability of certain items included by 
defendants in a list of costs incurred on a previous appeal 
wherein the court had given the defendants their costs. 
Reasoning by analogy from a federal statute (the court was then 
a territorial court) which provided for the allowance of an 
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attorney fee of $20 on a trial before a jury, which statute was 
construed by the Utah court to apply only to the trial in the 
nisi prius courts, the Marks opinion held that an attorney's 
fee could not be included as part of the costs awarded 
defendant after stating "as to the item charged as 'attorney 
fee,' we know of no law authorizing its allowance for trials in 
this court on appeal." _!i., 26 P. at 744. The Marks opinion 
stands only for the proposition that attorney's fees are not 
costs, and are not to be awarded to a successful party who 
receives an award of costs without explicit mention of 
attorney's fees. 
The second authority cited in support of the qualifying 
language in Downey State Bank was Keller v. Lonsdale, 216 Or. 
339, 339 P.Zd 112 (1959). That was an action to foreclose the 
interest of the defendants, the purchasers of ten coin-operated 
television sets, under two conditional sales contracts. The 
defendants appealed from a trial court decree in favor of the 
plaintiff which included an award to plaintiff of its 
attorney's fees. In affirming the trial court's opinion, the 
Oregon court denied plaintiff's request for an allowance of a 
reasonable sum for attorney's fees incurred on appeal stating 
"in the absence of precedent, legislative sanction, or a 
contractual stipulation contemplating such an allowance on 
appeal, the request 1-1ill be denied." ~·· 339 P.Zd at 118. 
That case established the Oregon rule that attorney's fees on 
appeal would not be awarded pursuant to a contractual provision 
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for attorney's fees unless the contract specifically mentioned 
attorney's fees on appeal in addition to attorney's fees 
generally. Though this judicial rule has been consistently 
applied in Oregon, see, ~· McMillan v. Golden, 262 Or. 317, 
497 P.2d 1166 (1972), that jurisdiction is in a distinct 
minority in holding to that view as will later be shown. 
However, even this narrow interpretation applied in Oregon 
recognizes the importance of enforcing a contractual provision 
for attorney's fees. 
The final authority cited in Downey State Bank in support 
of the qualifying language therein set forth and the apparent 
source of that qualifying language is 5 Am.Jur.Zd, Appeal and 
Error, 1022. That section includes the statement: 
Attorneys' fees are taxable as costs on 
appeal only when authorized by statute 
or rule of court. Id. at p. 445. 
This statement merely reiterates the position taken in Marks v. 
Culmer that a party awarded its costs on appeal may not include 
as a part thereof its attorney's fees for the appeal unless 
expressly authorized to do so by statute or court rule or 
order. It does not detract from the view that a contractual 
provision for attorney's fees should be enforced. 
The rule of discretion previously announced by this court 
has much to recommend itself as applied to suits in equity such 
as divorce actions which actions seem to provide the most 
frequent occasion for the award of attorney's fees on appeal. 
See, Bates v. Bates, 560 P.Zd 706 (Utah 1977); Eastman v. 
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Eastman, 558 P.Zd 514 (Utah 1976) and cases cited therein at 
516 N. 3. However, in cases where a cont.ractual provision for 
attorney's fees is operative, respondent submits that this 
court may forge a rule of law in awarding attorney's fees 
incurred on appeal by the prevailing party as a matter of 
course, thus lessening the burden on this Court of examining 
the detailed circumstances of each such case to decide whether 
the award would be appropriate. Oregon has already done so to 
a limited extent as explained above and virtually every other 
Western jurisdiction to consider the matter in recent years has 
adopted the rule that where a contract provides even generally 
for the award of attorney's fees as a part of the expenses 
incurred in enforcing the contract, the prevailing party on an 
appeal is to receive its attorney's fees for that appeal 
notwithstanding the lack of mention of an appeal in the 
contract. See, generally, the annotation at 52 A.L.R.Zd 
863-874 and cases cited therein and in the later case service. 
For example, the Supreme Court of California has ruled that 
a party who successfully defends on appeal the correctness of a 
lower court judgment in enforcing a contract is to be awarded 
the reasonable attorney's fees incurred in connection with that 
appeal where the contract provides for a reasonable attorney's 
fee "in case suit is instituted to collect this note." Wilson 
v. Wilson, 54 Cal.2d 264, 5 Cal.Rptr. 317, 352 P.2d 725, 731 
(1960). Subsequently, the Arizona Supreme Court adopted the 
same rule in Steele v. Vanderslice, 90 Ariz. 277, 367 P.Zd 636 
(1961) and there stated, at 367 P.Zd 643: 
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The more recent authorities considering 
contracts which provide for attorneys' 
fees have made allowances for 
additional fees for the prosecution or 
defense of an action in the appellate 
courts. (Citations omitted). 
Arizona has not only maintained that position, Amos Flight 
Operations, Inc. v. Thunderbird Bank, 112 Ariz. 263, 540 P.2d 
1244 (1975), but has extended the award of attorney's fees on 
appeal to the prevailing party in any contested action arising 
out of a contract, apparently even in the absence of 
contractual language providing for attorney's fees generally. 
Gressley v. Patterson Tillage & Leveling, Inc., 579 P.2d 1124 
(Ariz. App. 1978). 
Other jurisdictions adopting the rule which respondent 
urges this court to adopt are set forth as follows: 
Washington, Puget Sound Mutual Savings Bank v. Lillions, 50 
Wash. 2d 799, 314 P.2d 935 (1957); Idaho, Vaughn v. Vaughn, 91 
Idaho 544, 428 P.2d 50 (1967); New Mexico, Cabot v. First 
National Bank of Santa Fe, 81 N.M. 795, 474 P.2d 478 (1970); 
Colorado, Zambruk v. Perlmutter Third General Builders, Inc., 
510 P.2d 472 (Colo. App. 1973) approved in Hartman v. Freedman, 
591 P.2d 1318 (Colo. 1979); and Montana, Hollinger v. 
McMichael, 594 P.2d 1120 (Mont. 1979). 
An insightful analysis of this issue was given by the 
Appellate Court of Colorado in Zambruk v. Perlmutter, supr~, 
wherein the court stated, at 510 P.Zd 475-76: 
The question presented is whether a 
contractual provision for attorney's 
fees, as contained in a contract, 
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includes an allowance for legal 
services rendered upon an appellate 
review of an action growing out of the 
instrument containing such provision. 
In similar situations, some cases have 
held that attorneys' fees should not be 
allowed for successfully defending an 
appeal. These decisions are based on 
various grounds, i.e., that the 
contract was mergea-Tn the judgment or 
that the fees were not within the 
contemplation of the parties. See 
Ann., 52 A.L.R.Zd 863. However~he 
majority view expressed in the more 
recent cases allows such fees on 
appeal. (Citations omitted). In our 
opinion, these cases present the better 
reasoned rule which we adopt. 
The purpose of a provision for 
attorneys' fees is to indemnify the 
creditor or the prevailing party 
against the necessity of paying an 
attorney's fee and to enable him to 
recover the full amount of the 
obligation. 
The appropriateness of modifying the rule of discretion in 
this state so as to more readily award attorneys' fees on 
appeal in the manner and under the circumstances just suggested 
by the Colorado court has already been implicitly recognized by 
this Court in Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp., 592 
P.Zd 620 (Utah 1979) wherein, at 625-26, it was stated: 
The general rule on this point is that 
attorneys' fees are not recoverable 
unless allowed by statute or contracted 
for by the parties unless, of course, 
equity permits otherwise. (Footnotes 
omitted). 
In the instant action, the parties contracted for an award 
of attorney's fees. Accordingly, this case presents an 
appropriate occasion for this Court to not only award 
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respondent its attorney's fees incurred in connecti~n with this 
appeal under the rule of discretion heretofore in effect in 
this state, but also to modify that rule so as t'o make the 
award of attorney's fees on appeal more a matter of course 
where the contract enforced by the action on appeal provides 
for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party. 
CONCLUSION 
As the facts in this case show that the contract at issue 
was both prima facie severable under the apportionability test 
and meets the requirements of the essence of the contract test 
in that it would have been entered into even for fewer than 
eight lots, the finding of the trial court that the contract 
was severable should be sustained and its judgment upheld. As 
this appeal taken by appellant has caused the respondent to 
incur additional attorney's fees in its action to enforce the 
contract, this Court should issue an order directing the trial 
court to determine and award to respondent the reasonable 
attorney's fees it incurred as a result of this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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